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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
COMPENSATION CLAIMS FOR LOSSES OF ACCESS
RIGHTS TO INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS
The growth of the national system of interstate highways' has created a
legal controversy over the claims of those people owning property along
an existing highway who seek to be compensated for loss of their direct
access to the highways. A cursory look at the scope of limited-access
highways2 and expressways 3 planned for the system shows the importance
of the controversy. By 1969, one hundred billion dollars will be spent on
roads, over 50% of which will be placed in 5500 miles of expressways
skirting or penetrating 90% of all cities of more than 50,000 population.4
By 1975, 41,00 miles of connected interstate highways will be completed 5
with almost every state in the union affected. For example, Illinois alone
is to receive 1608 miles of limited-access highways6 to be complemented
by several state programs of major proportion. 7 Since an abutter s on a
highway system built on lands bought by the state does not have a right of
access to it,9 the discussion herein is limited to the one-fourth of the inter-
1 Federal Interstate and Defense Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 101 (1956).
2111. Rev. Stat. ch. 951, § 109(i) (1963): a controlled or limited-access highway is
"every street or highway in respect to which owners or occupants of abutting lands
and other persons have no right of access to or from the same except at such points
only as may be determined by the public authority having jurisdiction over such
streets or highways."
3 Covey, Right of Access and the Illinois Highway Program, 47 ILL. BAR J. 634 (1959):
an expressway is a highway which gives a greater degree of preference to through
traffic by prohibiting all direct access. Access is gained by ramps and other means of
indirect entry into the flow of traffic.
4 EDITORS OF FORTUNE, EXPLODING METROPOLIS (1958).
5 Covey, Frontage Roads: To Compensate or Not to Compensate, 56 Nw. U.L. REV.
587 (1961).
6 Covey, Right of Access and the Illinois Highway Program, 47 ILL. BAR J. 634 (1959).
7 The Illinois Toll Road Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, § 314a (1957), authorized the
construction of 187 miles of controlled-access roads in the area adjecent to Chicago.
The Illinois Freeways Act, 1 Laws of Il1. 1943, at 1177, repealed and superseded by pro-
visions of the 1959 Illinois Highway Code, authorized all counties of more than 500,000
population to construct expressways to be financed by the sale of bonds. Cook County
has constructed four expressways under this authorization: the Northwest (John F.
Kennedy), Congress (Dwight D. Eisenhower), the Dan Ryan, and the Southwest.
8 An abutter is a person who uses the land which is directly next to (abutting) the
highway. The term is not limited to the owner, but applies to whoever has possession
of the land.
9 State v. Calkins, 50 Wash. 716, 719, 314 P.2d 449, 450 (1957): "Where a new limited-
access highway is established by condemnation in an area where no highway previously
existed, there is no taking of an easement of access, because such an easement has
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state system which is to be built or placed on present conventional high-
ways. l0
An abutting landowner's right of access is a property right" entitled to
the same legal safeguards as other rights incident to his realty. The con-
troversy over compensation for the extinguishment or substantial impair-
ment of this property right is based upon a decision as to whether such
limitation should be compensated through the state's eminent domain
power, 12 or whether the state is exercising its right to regulate traffic, in
which case it is exercising its "police power' '1 3 in such a way that compen-
sation is not required.
An abutter's right of access has not always been a property right. In
fact, the entire concept of access is relative"y new to the law. Previously,
the roads were considered the private property of those landowners who
built them and through whose property t:hey passed.14 The degree of
ownership enjoyed by these landowners, and the relationship between the
public's use of the highway and the landowner, were acutely stated by
Lord Mansfield in the historic case of Good;itle v. Alker:15 "The King has
nothing but the passage for himself and for his people, but the freehold
and all profits belong to the owner of the soil."' 01 At first, the roads were
the landowner-farmer's only means of travelling to the closest commu-
nity. This meant that the roads played a significant role in the develop-
ment of the farmer's lands, and the primary purpose of these early roads,
usually no more than a path through the woods, was to provide the farmer
with a means of communication. With the expansion of the country and
never in fact existed." See South Meadow Realty Corp. v. State, 144 Conn. 289, 130
A.2d 290 (1957); Smick v. Commonwealth, 268 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1956); State v. Burk,
200 Ore. 211, 265 P.2d 783 (1954).
10 Covey, Frontage Roads: To Compensate or N6t to Compensate, 56 Nw. U.L. REV.
587 (1961).
11 Hillerege v. City of Scottsbluff, 164 Neb. 560, 573, 83 N.W.2d 76, 84 (1957): "The
right of access of an owner of property abutting on a street to ingress and egress to and
from his premises by way of such street is a property right in the nature of an ease-
ment in the street which the owner of abutting property has, not in common with
the public generally. .. ."
12 111. Const. of 1870 art. II, § 13: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation.... "
13 Note, 3 STAN. L. REV. 298, 302 (1951): police power is that "power which the
state inherently has to restrict property rights withcut paying compensation by regula-
tions tending to promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare."
14 Watson v. Sparks, 1 Salk. 287, 71 Eng. Rep. 2.55 (Q.B. 1707); Lade v. Shepherd,
2 Str. 1004, 93 Eng. Rep. 997 (K.B. 1733). For a general discussion of the history of
access, see Duhaime, Limiting Access to Highways, 33 ORE. L. REv. 16(1953).
15 1 Burr 133, 97 Eng. Rep. 231 (K.B. 1757).
16 Id. at 143, 97 Eng. Rep. at 236.
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the increasing importance of travel, the need for planned highway systems
for public use became evident. The implementation of the plans required
that the states take title to the roads in order to guarantee that the public's
right to the use of the roads would not be impaired. Those landowners
abutting the public roads gained the right to enter or leave their land at
any point on the highway, thus giving rise to the right of access. Com-
plete and direct access became recognized as an important property right
to be protected by operation of law"7 and was subject to the sole restric-
tion that the public's right to travel the roads was paramount.1 8
The continued development of the highway system led to the need to
limit an abutting landowner's access rights. Allowing him free access any-
where on his land interfered with the public's right to travel, because they
never knew at what point someone might enter or leave the highway. To
provide for an adequate limitation without unnecessarily interfering with
an abutter's ingress and egress, access has been limited to that which is
reasonable. 19
In discussing access, at least passing mention must be made of circuity
of travel 20 and diversion of traffic.21 An abutting land user who must take
a circuitous route from his property to reach the highway has suffered an
injury,22 as has the person whose business has suffered economically by the
diversion of traffic from it. This rather typical quote from a decision in
point shows that neither has suffered a compensable injury:
the general rule is that there is no property right of an abutting property
owner in the free flow of traffic past his property and thus no compensation
can be claimed if traffic is diverted from his premises or made to travel a more
circuitous route.2 3
17 See Duhaime, supra note 14.
Is See Covey, Highway Protection through Control of Access and Roadside Develop-
ment, 1959 Wis. L. REV. 567.
19 Hillerege v. City of Scottsbluff, supra note 11, at 574, 83 N.W.2d at 85: "The
measure of the right of the property owner abutting on a street to access to and from
it by way of the street is reasonable ingress and egress under all circumstances."
20 Circuity of travel is the necessity of taking a more roundabout (circuitous) route
of travel to reach an abutter's property.
21 Diversion of traffic is the consequence of constructing a highway in such a way
that traffic is diverted from passing in front of an abutter's property as it once did.
22 See Covey, Frontage Roads: To Compensate or Not to Compensate, 56 Nw. U.L.
REV. 587 (1961). Mr. Covey states that the three major losses suffered by abutters upon
being placed on a limited-access highway or an expressway are decline in the market
value of their lands, decline in the accessibility to their properties, and a loss of poten-
tial exploitation of the express lanes of the road.
23 State v. Ensley, 240 Ind. 472, 489, 164 N.E.2d 342, 350 (1960). See Department of
Public Works and Buildings v. Mabee, 22 lll.2d 202, 174 N.E.2d 801 (1961).
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Although many pleas for compensation have been made, the courts have
consistently held that circuity of travel 24 and diversion of traffic25 are not
regarded as interferences with an abutter's property rights, and that the
damage suffered is noncompensable.
As regards this discussion of the legal repercussions of the extinguish-
ment of a landowner's access rights, "police power" is that power which
the state has to regulate traffic in the interest of the public safety. 26 It ap-
pears that the definition of "regulation" has gained in scope to the point
that compensation can be denied an abutter under almost any circum-
stances. The "normal" and obvious regula:ory devices interfering with an
abutter's access are traffic signals, no-left.turn signs,27 one-way streets, 28
the allowing of only certain traffic on a street,29 closing streets to traffic,3 0
and not allowing vehicles over a certain weight to use a street.31 Such reg-
ulations can be as injurious to an abutter as those for which compensation
is regularly granted, but they are not compensated so long as they are
reasonable, and it seems that "a regulation or ordinance adopted to speed
up traffic and eliminate danger is reasonable. ' 'a2
From these "standard" methods for regulating traffic, police power has
been expanded to include the placing of median strips or curbs between
the lanes of a highway to prevent traffic from crossing to the other side. 33
Such action is even more of a direct interference with an abutter's right
of access, because he will only be allowed to enter and leave his property
24 Illinois Malleable Iron Co. v. Commissioners of Lincoln, 263 Ill. 446, 105 N.E.336
(1914) ;Hanson v. City of Omaha, 157 Neb. 403, !;9 N.W.2d 622 (1953); Selig v. State,
10 N.Y.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 59 (1961); Walker v. State, 48 Wash.2d 587, 295 P.2d 328
(1956).
25 Arkansas Highway Commission v. Bingham, 231 Ark. 934, 333 S.W.2d 728 (1960);
People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943); Department of Public Works
and Buildings v. Mabee, supra note 23; Dantzer v. Indianapolis Union Ry. Co., 141 Ind.
604, 39 N.E.223 (1894); Selig v. State, supra note 24; State v. Linzell, 136 Ohio St. 97,
126 N.E.2d 53 (1955).
26 Police power, defined supra note 13, is regulation as distinguished from the
concept of "taking" under eminent domain.
27 Iowa State Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755 (1957);
Jones Beach Boulevard Estates v. Moses, 268 N.Y. 362, 197 N.E. 313 (1935).
28 Commonwealth v. Nolan, 189 Ky. 34, 224 S.lW,. 506 (1920).
29 Illinois Malleable Iron Co. v. Commissioners Df Lincoln, supra note 24.
30 Chicago National Bank v. City of Chicago Heights, 14 Il.2d 135, 150 N.E.2d 827
(1958).
31 Fergusaon Coal Co. v. Thompson, 343 Ill. 20. 174 N.E. 896 (1931).
32 Jones Beach Boulevard Estates v. Moses, supra note 27 at 369, 197 N.E. at 315.
33 Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Mabee, supra note 23.
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in one direction.3 4 However, preventing cars from crossing from one side
of a highway to the other clearly is a regulatory device which promotes
traffic safety, and
rights of abutter are subject to rights of the state to regulate and control the
public highways for the benefit of the travelling public, even though the abut-
ter may be inconvenienced. . .. 35
While the use of median strips in the center of a highway can be ra-
tionalized as a means of controlling the traffic's flow by only impairing an
abutter's access to the degree that he can only go but one way,3 6 some
courts have held that the placement of curbing or other means of impair-
ment in front of an abutter's property is a regulatory device requiring no
compensation.3 That such curbs are useful in the promotion of traffic
safety is not to be questioned, but the effect of such actions on the abut-
ter's right of access is a direct extinguishment of his rights of ingress and
egress, an action for which most authorities feel compensation should be
given.38 Those favoring such action as an exercise of police power prob-
ably rationalize their position by claiming that the regulatory importance
of placing the curbing in front of his property is so great that it overrides
the "taking" aspect of such action.
The broadening scope of the regulatory nature of police power reaches
its greatest width in those cases which hold that limited-access highways
or expressways are created to regulate the flow of traffic, thus promoting
traffic safety, and are therefore an exercise of the state's police power.
3 9
Clearly, this is not the attitude taken by many courts, but it clearly shows
the extent to which the concept of police power has been expanded.
If it were possible to find a corresponding reduction in the scope of
eminent domain, the solution to the controversy might be obtained by
34 Id. at 205, 174 N.E.2d at 802: "the rule [regarding compensation] cannot be ap-
plied ... where the property owner's free and direct access to the land of traffic abutting
on his property has not been taken or impaired."
35 Calumet Federal Savings and Loan Association v. City of Chicago, 306 Ill. App.
524, 529, 29 N.E.2d 292, 294 (1940).
36 The fact that an analogy is possible between the creation of one-way streets and
highways separated by a median strip in the center may be an important factor in hold-
ing such action to be an exercise of police power.
37 Calumet Federal Savings and Loan Association v. City of Chicago, supra note 35;
Ryan v. Rosenstone, 20 Ill.2d 79, 169 N.E.2d 360 (1960); Department of Public Works
and Buildings v. Maddox, 21 Ill.2d 489, 173 N.E.2d 448 (1961); Darnall v. State, 79 S.D.
59, 108 N.W.2d 201 (1961).
38 Hillerege v. City of Scottsbluff, supra note 11; McMoran v. State, 55 Wash.2d 37,
345 P.2d 598 (1959).
39 Riddle v. State Highway Commission, 184 Kan. 603, 339 P.2d 301 (1959); Nick
v. State Highway Commission, 13 Wis.2d 511, 109 N.W.2d 71 (1961).
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comparison, but such is not the case. It is difficult to discern any pattern
to the use of eminent domain compared to that pattern found for police
power, but this is probably due to the fact that many more factors are
present in eminent domain.40 It would serve no useful purpose to make an
exhaustive study of all access cases dealing with eminent domain, except
to show by way of example the variety of ways eminent domain has been
used to compensate a landowner. Compens'ation has been granted in those
cases in which an abutter's access was impaired or eliminated by an ele-
vated train or streetcar,41 a bridge,42 the closing of a street,43 changing of
a street's grade, 44 construction of a safety island in the center of a high-
way,45 construction of curbing in front of a landowner's property,46 con-
struction of an underpass, 47 widening of a highway,48 and the conversion
of a conventional highway into a limited-access one. 40 As a matter of prac-
tice, many states 0 condemn a landowner's access rights without bringing
the matter into court. Also, the creation of a limited-access highway often
requires the condemnation of a portion of a landowner's property, and his
loss of access is reflected in the amount paid.
401n deciding whether eminent domain is applicable many questions have to be
answered, the major ones being did the abutter suffer an injury which was different
from the injury suffered by the community as a whole, and did the abutter have a
reasonable means of ingress and egress. Related to the question of reasonableness of
access are circuity of travel and diversion of traffic. The only factor involved in deter-
mining police power is whether the state's action can reasonably be classified as a
regulation or regulatory device.
41Adams v. Chicago, B. & N.R. Co., 39 Minn. 286, 39 N.W. 629 (1888); Story v.
New York Elevated R.R. Co., 90 N.Y. 122 (18k:2); Lahr v. Metropolitan Elevated
R.R. Co., 104 N.Y. 268, 10 N.E. 528 (1887).
42 Field v. Barling, 149 Ill. 556, 37 N.E. 850 (1894).
43 Village of Winnetka v. Clifford, 201 Ill. 475, 66 N.E. 384 (1903).
44 Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943); Horn v. City of
Chicago, 403 Ill. 549, 87 N.E.2d 642 (1949); Coyne v. City of Memphis, 118 Tenn. 651,
102 S.W. 355 (1907).
45 State v. Linzell, supra note 25. 46 See supra note 38.
4 7 Rose v. State, 19 Cal.2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942).
48 People v. Ricciardi, supra note 25.
49 Mississippi State Highway Commission v. F:.nch, 237 Miss. 314, 114 So.2d 673
(1959).
50 See Covey, Frontage Roads: To Compensate or Not to Compensate, 56 Nw. U.L.
REv. 587 (1961). Mr. Covey sent a questionnaire : every state highway commission
asking them if they compensated abutters for their loss of direct access to an express-
way even though a frontage road was provided. Of the forty-five who replied,
twenty-two said they did compensate as a matter cf course, and twenty states and the
District of Columbia replied that they did not. California and Illinois said that as a
general rule, they would compensate if the frontage road was not part of the old
highway.
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From the above discussion, it is clear that there is a certain "overlap" in
which the same fact situation could conceivably be decided either way. 51
Opposing results have occurred in cases dealing with the erection of curb-
ing,52 creation of limited-access highways, 53 and the closing of a street to
traffic. 54 A similar result could well occur in other situations, and, thus, a
real problem exists in determining whether a landowner should or should
not be compensated.
Among the variety of solutions offered, the one given the most interest
is the creation of a test or formula which would determine whether emi-
nent domain or police power should prevail.5 Such a test does not seem
to have been devised. The biggest obstacle is finding factors upon which
to base a workable test. Unfortunately, most attempts have ended with
terms similar to those which have helped create the controversy. One
writer feels the need for the property and the burden of compensation
upon the public, on the one hand, and the injury to the landowner, on the
other, should be considered.56 Another suggests that the abutter's right of
access be set against the government's power to create reasonable regula-
tions.57 A third writer chooses to balance "the rights of the landowner, the
rights of the highway user, and the rights of the state." '58
Two solutions proposed by the courts are more pragmatic but do not
take in the full impact of the controversy. They both deal with determin-
ing whether the regulation as a police power is reasonable. These solutions
are important, for, if the regulatory power is unreasonable, the police
51 This discussion of "overlap" and a court's decision of similar factual situations
applies to a hypothetical court that is free to decide the issue without disrupting
precedent.
52 As to curbing in the center of a highway, see supra note 33 (police power) and
supra note 45 (eminent domain). As to curbing in front of a landowner's property,
see supra note 37 (police power) and supra note 38 (eminent domain).
53 See supra note 39 (police power) and supra note 49 (eminent domain).
54 See supra note 30 (police power) and supra note 43 (eminent domain).
55 See HAAR, CHARLES (ed.), LAW AND LAND: ANGLo-AMERICAN PLANNING PRACTICE
(1964). Mr. David Craig, in his chapter Regulation and Purchase: Two Governmental
Ways to Attain Planned Land Use, contends that the differences between eminent
domain and police power are practically extinct and that old tests between them are
no longer dependable. (See the Book Review section of this issue for a review of Mr.
Haar's book).
5 6 Note, 11 KAN. L. REV. 388 (1963). These comments as to the sufficiency of the
terms proposed are not to be interpreted as criticism of those who formulated them
but are meant to illustrate this contention that the solution to the problem is, at best,
most difficult.
57 Note, 14 BAYLOR L. REV. 70 (1962).
58 Covey, Highway Protection through Control of Access and Roadside Develop-
ment, 1959 Wis. L. REV. 567, 576.
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power cannot be applied and the remedy of eminent domain may be avail-
able. A California court held that all questions of the reasonableness of a
regulation were within the purview of the legislature, and the court
looked to it for a determination of the issue. 59 The other pragmatic solu-
tion is that deference be given to the position of the state highway com-
mission or similar body on the question of the reasonableness of a regula-
tion, because the commission is believed to have superior knowledge
of all the factors involved. 60
Two obvious solutions to the controversy would be to build all express-
ways and limited-access highways on new sites, thus alleviating the need
for compensation;61 or to create legislation superseding the concepts of
police power and eminent domain, thus granting compensation only under
specific factual situations determined by the legislature.62 Both of these
solutions, however, duck the issue at hand-namely, to find a method of
distinguishing eminent domain from police power.
To be just, any solution must take into consideration the age-old prob-
lem of the rights of the public clashing with the rights of the individual.
On the one hand, if every access right is to be compensated, the construc-
tion of this much-desired highway system will be impeded by lack of
funds. On the other hand, if a landowner's right of access, a property right
in the past, can be taken without compensation, an injustice is being done
to him. Of all the solutions proposed, perhaps the most acceptable would
be a modification of the "formula" approach.63 This proffered "solution,"
while by no means completely satisfactory, would be to place all factors
involved (legal, social, economic and political) in a "formula" in which
"the police power ends and the eminent domain power begins when the
injury to the abutter in not being paid is greater than the injury to the
public in having to pay for the property."
' 4
Paul Engstrom
59 Graham v. Kingwell, 218 Cal. 658, 24 P.2d 488 (1933).
60 Ryan v. Rosenstone, supra note 37; Iowa State Highway Commission v. Smith,
supra note 27.
61 See supra note 9.
62 Since both eminent domain and the state's police power are usually guarantees
found in the state's constitution, such a solution would require a great deal of work to
accomplish.
63 See Note, 3 STAN. L. REV. 298, 302 (1951): "When does the taking of a property
right cease being useful and start being necessary? ... The answer ... does not depend
on legal concepts at all. Rather it is dependent upon economic and social considerations."
64 Covey, Frontage Roads: To Compensate or Not to Compensate, 56 Nw. U.L. REv.
587, 606 (1961).
